This paper analyses the challenges confronting local governance institutions on peace building strategies using Southwestern Nigeria as a reference point. It puts the challenges of peace building strageies in institutional perspectives and intervening tendencies of foreign agencies in Africa. It examines Lederach's structural framework under the theoretical discourse as an underlying assumption for peace building challenges. However, primary data were collected and analysed for the empirical insight using Relative Impact Index and content analysis methods. This paper reveals that lack of shared vision (RII = 3.49), finances (RII = 3.34), poor information communication network (RII = 3.26), and deficiency of institutional arrangement (RII = 3.24) are the foremost challenges facing local governance institutions on peace building in South western Nigeria; with greater emphasis on poor value system and non-compliance with traditional customs. It therefore concludes that the peace building strategies are susceptible to unfavourable conditions by activities of governance institutions at the local level. It thus recommends that formal and informal institutions at the local level should share a common vision which will serve as a driving force for the pursuit of peace building agenda in Africa.
INTRODUCTION
The quest for peacebuilding in developing countries remains a requisite action when interactions among the people, groups and communities are flawed by numerous social vices. Moreover, retaliation is most often the order of the day among the conflict-driven people, groups and communities. Hence, the imperativeness of peacebuilding becomes thus essential so as to establish resolution strategies, thereby thwarting the menace of vengeance in the societies. To this end, a cross-sectional review of available literature has empirically lent credence to how conflict-prone environments could transform to peace-reigning ones. Generally, the intricacies of peacebuilding across the world have not been without some challenges on its strategies and components. A crosssectional review of literatures (Aning, 2008; Obiekwu, 2009; Noll, 2013; MacGinty, 2013 and Lamidi, 2019) identified the lack of shared visions, difficulties in managing trade-offs between conflicting parties, proliferation of peacebuilding plans and frameworks, governance and accountability inadequacies, deficiency of institutional arrangement, overcentralisation of peacebuilding implementation strategies and poor strategic communication among others. Hence, this paper extols the noticeable signatures of some of these challenges amongst others Local governance, in this context, tends to be the centre action of peacebuilding exercise, and thus, inherits some of the challenges in the face of conflictual adversities which are not very close to the ambit of governance at the regional or national levels. This places enormous tasks on the local governance authorities. Specifically in Southwestern Nigeria, Omotosho (2013) explained that these persistent deteriorations have beleaguered the quality of local governance, thus leading to instability and the weakening of all public institutions and emergence of communal clashes. Also, the relationship among citizens, groups and communities, who supposed to live together in peace, became very bitter because of the actions or inactions of governance institutions on peace sustenance at the local level. Moreover, peaceful co-existence among citizens and communities remains a coordinate responsibility of a resident government due to its localness. It is based on this pre-expository insight that this study underscores the challenging nexus between local governance and peacebuilding between using Southwestern Nigeria as a reference point.
CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION LOCAL GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS
Local governance institutions exist in various forms either traditional (i.e carry-overs from precolonial times) or relatively recent indigenous responses to the limitations of the post-colonial state institutions. These include political/administrative institutions centered around newly created 'chiefs', trade and professional guilds, age grade associations, town/village unions, community development associations, women's groups as well as religious and social organisations. Local governance institutions appear so explicit and lucid for the discourse in this research, and more recently, Olaleye (2016) averred that the above-mentioned institutions at the local level play active roles in the administration of justice, maintenance of law and order, peace-making and peace-keeping, provision of security and conflict resolution. Furthermore, series of researches conducted on local institutions in Nigeria have placed high premium on the significant roles of local institutions on socio-economic development. Some examples are: constructions of roads and bridges, building of schools and health facilities, management of markets, construction of police stations, court houses, community banks, revenue generation and labour mobilization for community projects and for mutual aid and welfare (Adebanwi, 2004; Howard, 2012; and Lamidi, 2019) .
PEACE BUILDING
Peace building practices reflect principles of reconciliation based on long-term conflict transformation, peaceable relationships and values. These customary efforts seem to be effective in addressing intra-community and even inter-community conflicts where relationships and shared values formed the bases of the reconciliation processes. Peace building strategies are embedded in the culture and history of Africans. These traditional practices accentuate collective unity, reconciliation of individuals or groups, and peaceful reintegration into the community. Peace building techniques give more priority to collective interest above any individual interest. The machineries of customary conflict resolution and peace building artistry believe that all parties are interested in and affected by the conflict situation, and the traditional goal of taking cognizance of the need to reconcile both parties has become sacrosanct for promotion of social harmony, peace and development. Mofasony (2012) argued that the failure of the conventional method of conflict management is linked to the bias motive of the intervening agencies. In the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe mediation in 1976-1979, the Africans' believe that Britain and U.S. sympathy were to the white Rhodesians. Also U.S. interest has always been established strongly in the intervention between Israel and Arab neighbours, etc. The best approach still rest on research targeted on how groups can manage conflicts themselves, how they can become proactive to conflict management, and how they can become facilitators themselves. The peace building process facilitated the development of neighbourhood justice centre which roughly falls into three categories: those attached to, run by, or closing connected to the courts; those connected to prosecutors' office; and those that are community or church based. The justification for peace building, community based adjudication, mediation and arbitration and resolution is embedded on coercion is ineffective, society cannot remain stable unless the people see the power structure as legitimate and those who occupy positions of power as deserving to hold the position. Therefore, peace building is designed to help the poor, the downtrodden; that is, those with no access to the expensive legal system and between conflicting parties with less emphasis on logicality but on morality accompanied with in-depth understanding of the issues in context. Okoro (2014) argued that theorist on this perspective should move from institution to persons as the units of analysis. The processpromoting scheme is intended to have a more indirect, longer-term, impact on the conflict, through the involvement of opinion leaders, or key members of the attentive public, whose experience at the exercise can be translated into ideas and action that, at some stage in the future may form an intra-party environment that permits and encourages conflict-reducing strategies on the part of the leaders. Peace building is regarded as problem -solving exercises. It may thus be intended and shaped to have a direct effect upon key decision-makers and immediate cause of the conflict; they may be set up to have a medium-term effect by developing new insights and visions of opportunity for key opinion-leaders and opinion formers, and thus preparing a suitable intra-party environment for the successful handing of conflict-reduction procedures; they may be aimed at an even longer term educational goal through the transferring of conflict resolution skills, techniques and philosophies widely within one or two communities, so that very long term expectations and relationships can be transformed eventually into those not based upon conflict and coercion.
LITERATURE REVIEW
More observations have been made on the difficulties being confronted in managing the trade-offs between conflicting issues with short and long term objectives of peacebuilding. An extensive discourse has been put forth as to the dimensions of trade-offs which could ensue either during the short-term peacebuilding objectives and long-term peacebuilding framework (Adebanwi, 2004; Albert, 2007; Mofasony, 2012; and Howard, 2012) . The possibility of trade-offs among local institutions is most likely obtainable due to the disagreement perspectives of stakeholders as to what could be agreed upon as reconciliatory frameworks for articulating critical questions concerning the kinds of peaceful arrangement that is desirable and the strategies for achieving it (MacGinty, 2013; & Okoro, 2014) . In Timor-Leste, the monitoring survey revealed that there was mixed view as to the concept and operationalisation of peacebuilding strategies on the re-integration of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) into their respective communities after the conflicts (OECD, 2010) . In addition, the inability to locally guide peacebuilding strategies may lead to the proliferation of peacebuilding plans and frameworks. This, in-turn, becomes an impeding factor to the actualisation of lasting peace. Evidences of multiple peacebuilding processes are noted in the fragmentation of donor-funded activities which mostly occur in the absence of reconciliatory efforts by the government in the conflict-ravaging countries (Obiekwu, 2009) . In this light, it becomes somewhat difficult for harmonising a single peacebuilding strategic framework among the international agencies (Lemay-Herbert and Toupin, 2011; and Ebegbulem, 2012) . Moreover, there is a continued tendency for the external agencies to continue to seek for the implementation of their peacebuilding agenda respectively which could further be both a cause and symptoms for this challenge.
While it was noted that majority of countries in the third-world countries took the need for peacebuilding strategic plan with levity. Existing studies have identified the causes of poor performance of developing world on the implementation of peacebuilding strategies (Aning, 2008; Obiekwu, 2009; UNDP, 2010; MacGinty, 2013; and Okoro, 2014) . In Liberia and Southern Sudan, most Literature annotated the fact that weak managerial capacity and lack of leadership commitment are the preceding factors which weaken the coordination of peacebuilding strategies among government at all levels, as well as peace reconciliatory framework of the international partners (AU, 2007; & OECD, 2010) . The financial practices in peacebuilding exercise have, in most cases, failed to align with the peacebuilding planning processes and priorities, thus making response to the needs and expectations of individuals, groups, governments and international organization unrealistic. In most developing countries, studies conducted on peacebuilding transition financing reported that stakeholders in peacebuilding processes seem to place themselves on beneficial stage above that of the actual individuals, groups or governments who are actually in need of aid assistance or targeted beneficiaries (Ugwu, 2008; and OECD, 2010) . Thus, the financial budget may not be optimally used in the actualisation of peacebuilding strategies. On the other hand, in Burundi, financial aids are, most times, distributed in a disaggregated ways, thus distorting the peace enhancement framework; developing unnecessary tensions within and among the locally constituted authorities and international partners; and putting the trust of involved stakeholders in question. In most developing countries, the deficiency of institutional arrangement constitutes one of the impeding factors to the implementation of peacebuilding strategies. Although this factor tends to affect a lot of public policy programming virtually in all sectors of the economy. This indicates its same syndrome on the issue of peace sustainability in less-developed countries (Oguonu & Ezeibe, 2014) . In practical sense, institutions become weak when there appears to be lack of clarity among the governance institutions on what should be roles of each institutions in the peace reconciliatory processes vis-à-vis their agreed priorities. Since peacebuilding strategies are collective and tactical in its application to conflict types Francis, 2007; & Ademowo, 2015) , this institutional deficiency could go further to subvert the respective interventions by international agencies. For example, in Liberia, weak institutional arrangement remains a major obstacle, which if left unaddressed, would keep constraining the effective implementation of peacebuilding strategies (Mofasony, 2012) . Similarly, in Burundi, it has been observed that the creation of multiple structures is a causal factor for weak institutional arrangements (Noll, 2013) . The implementation of peacebuilding strategies has been more of a centralised matter. In most literature, this is mostly referred to as executive and capital-centric approach. Although, this is characterised as a feature of peacebuilding, yet challenging to its effective implementation. Most conflicts in developing countries have historic roots in group marginalisation (Noll, 2013; and Ademowo, 2015) . In this case, more frictions are likely to occur when politics takes the central stage on peacebuilding, leaving aside necessary inputs from the local intelligence. In Central Africa Republic, centralization of peace development agenda made the strategies of peacebuilding in Bangui unrealizable in due course. In Liberia, it was noted that urban-oriented peace reconciliatory framework has disintegrated majority of the local populace from institutional processes of governance (AU, 2007; and UNDP, 2010) . In Timor Leste, It becomes more obstructing when the international actors based their peacebuilding interventions on the executive information rather the political complexity and social fragility of the conflicting groups in the country (OECD, 2010) . In most developing countries, examples of consistent citizen involvement in peacebuilding process are somehow rare. They are in most cases being represented by local councils: most of whom are state-agents nurturing the agenda of the governments, not the citizens. Machava (2008) and Osaretin and Akov (2013) have respectively posited that even if the citizens are involved in the development of peacebuilding strategies, they are hardly found to be involved in the implementation of the peacebuilding strategies. This constitutes one of the major problems of peace sustainability in Dili, Timor-Leste, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sierra Leone (AU, 2007; Sanz & Tomlinson, 2012) . It becomes more worsen in emerging states where the culture of citizen participation has never been developed and the presence of state apparatus seems weak and incompetent. Poor strategic communication disables the enlightenment of social processes to the individuals, groups and communities in developing countries (OECD, 2010) . For example, the lack of strong awareness and communication on democratisation in Timor Leste almost put its political processes in jeopardy because individuals and groups internalized the concept as an undermining view to their system of governance. In addition, poor strategic communication has precluded political dialogue in most developing countries; restraining the information on government policies and decisions;
and weakening cross-cultural communication among the federating units in the third-world countries (AU, 2007; OECD, 2010; UNDP, 2010; and Noll, 2013) . In Sudan, the disintegration between the Northerners and Southerners is clearly as a result of poor strategic communication because irrespective of the different ethos, beliefs and values, communication could still afford them to consolidate the implementation of peacebuilding processes in the sovereign state (UNPBSO, 2012). Presently, the task of peacebuilding strategies is mostly shouldered by international agencies, such as UN, UNDP, EU and DFID in most developing countries of the World. This beckons on the indispensability of objective intervention and accountability between the government and internal agencies (Chigozie and Ituma, 2015) . Specifically, in most conflict ravaging countries in Africa, extant studies have shown that there are inconsistencies in the commitments of international agencies. Most of their financial and logistics pledges are not conspicuously disbursed. A leading example is that of Burundi where there was a 30% discrepancy between their roundtable pledges and disbursements. This was detected in a resource-mapping document of UNPBSO in 2008; and without any reason, there was no further investigation on this inappropriateness in their subsequent review process. Also, in Liberia, the pledges of international agencies in 2008 Berlin conference were not disbursed to a dependable level of aids required for the consolidation of peace and implementation of poverty reduction strategies which, ab initio, lured the international donors to pledge the assistance (OECD, 2010; UNPBSO, 2012) . In another dimension, the example of Central Africa Republic has revealed that the inability of the governments to make a long-term plan with time lapses between the donor fund commitments and its disbursements in order to enhance the transition of humanitarian aid to the development of peacebuilding (MacGinty, 2013; and Okoro, 2014) . Above all, Pan-African scholars have described over-reliance on international agencies for peacebuilding initiatives as an inhibiting factor. In their respective views, most African states have failed to internalise the need for the development of peacebuilding capacities due to high dependency on humanitarian assistance from foreign organisations (OECD, 2010; and UNDP, 2010) . In Burundi, Liberia, Timor Leste and Southern Sudan, lessons are yet to be learnt from international skills and knowledges despite series of interventions, short-term training and workshops by international agencies in these countries (OECD, 2010; UNPSBO, 2012; and MacGinty, 2013) . Peacebuilding strategies are yet to be institutionalised in top echelon of governmental administration, while it is not even noticeable at the local level. However, slight capacity development on peacebuilding could be discerned in Sierra-Leone and Liberia with little or no discussion on the behavioural and institutional issues on its strategic implementation.
THEORETICAL DISCOURSE: THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE
In Africa, exact instances of conflicts which developed into interior wars include Sudan, Zaire, Rwanda, Lesotho, Burundi, Liberia, and Uganda to mention but a few; turmoil in Cote D' Ivoire; state /rebels conflicts in Serra Leone, Angola and Guinea Bissau; genocide in Somali; and border conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria (Bakassi Pennisula). International Colloquium Report, as cited in Oguonu and Ezeibe (2014) also observed the increase in civil unrest in Africa after the end of Cold War. In fact, 70% of wars in Africa were intra-state in nature, with the continent hosting about 50% of all civil wars in the whole World (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) . The high concentration of civil wars in most developing World necessitates the imperativeness of peacebuilding theoretical framework and strategies in the conflict zones. A cross-sectional review of available literature shows the extensive analysis of how conflictprone environments could be transformed to peace-reigning ones. Most recommendations on the institutionalisation of peacebuilding drew from the structural framework of Lederach's peacebuilding approach. The identity-rooted nature of conflicts in Nigeria, just like other Africa countries' conflicts, has been elucidated. However, certain resolution mechanisms appear obvious and ubiquitous. Conflict transformation most often requires third-party involvement as means of mediating with the cultural epistemology of the people (Obiekwu, 2009 ). This should not be absolute, as it is mostly practised; however, it still does not propose noninvolvement of external mediators in resolving conflicts in Nigerian communities, rather collaboration with the indigenous institutions should be respected. Also, one of the important processes of peace sustainability is to construct or anchor a peace constituency or the peacebuilding process around local actors or home-grown mediators. According to Lederach's elicitive approach, as explained by Best (2005) , emphasized the significance of local institutions in conflict transformation and peacebuilding. Although, in spite of its critical institutional need for arresting conflicts in developing World, it requires allinclusive and organic roles of multiple actors involved in the conflict. However, several questions have been raised as to what the imperative institutional measures are to be put in place in the process of peacebuilding at the local level. Lederach, as observed by Johnston (2003) and Obiekwe (2009) , has introduced a more persuasive conceptual framework into the field of peacebuilding which explains the pyramidal and analytic structure of peace stakeholders and their roles in the process of peacebuilding across the population strata of community involved in conflict. He stratified the population of society alongside the existing three vertical levels and thereby categorising of peace leaders vis-à-vis their different roles, such as top level, middlerange, and grassroots peace facilitators. This tripartite framework aimed at capturing conflictensuing from any of the population or societal strata. At the top of the pyramid, this level constitutes the top peace actors who are elites in the society domineering military, religious and political spheres. This level has low number of people compared to the middle and grassroots levels. However, few actors at this level command public attention, and enjoy constant social recognition from the media, as well as legitimacy and social respect from local institutions (Wolfsfeld, 2003; & Howard, 2012) .
Sometimes, they constitute brains behind the insurgence and resurgence of conflicts due to political power tussle. For instance, the impact of these elites could not be handed off Boko Harram and Niger-Delta Avengers terrifying the North-eastern and Southsouthern parts of Nigeria respectively. To this end, these few oligarchies must be engaged and integrated in the official diplomacy and negotiations with the aim of achieving reconciliation and a cease-fire in an on-going violent conflict. Furthermore, Crane (2013) described this top level of Lederach's peacebuilding process as top-bottom approach. This implies that the dynamics of the few top stakeholders deal with broader political and substantive issues in the conflict. Moreso, the involvement of other strata of the society is a function of these few oligarchies due to the capitalist nature of Nigerian state, just like that of other developing World. At the second level, personality is a major considerable factor. Actors at this level command respect and authority within their institutional and social settings with little or no control from the constituted authority or governance structure (Cannon, 2009 ). These middle level actors are however different from the top-level actors because they are not few, and they do not benefit from the politically aggregated powers. Rather, they enjoy a relatively absolute freedom and tractability on their constituting groups and associations, such as ethnic groups, religious associations, NGOs and other professional societies. Leaders of these groups have significant status and influence on their immediate environments with no affiliation and governing calculus of the few oligarchies (Obiekwu, 2009; and Noll, 2013) . Remarkably, these groups comprise more individuals than the top-level actors. A major strength of these middle groups is that they have dual contact: one with the actors at the top; and the second, with the residents at the grassroots level. This feature places these groups at vantage position on the exercise of intermediate activities in any reconciliatory processes. Hence, the middle peace actors could play active roles on societal problem-solving and peace commissions. The third level constitutes the masses whose major social concerns hinge on daily survival needs. The symbolic leadership is observed at this level because of the series of engagement with localists' approaches aimed at mitigating the violent effects. They include various local or indigenous leaders of communities, clans, compounds, traditional associations, rural and cultural groups (Wolfsfeld, 2003; & Asiyanbola, 2007) . These leaders are the first-point of calls on any pathetic instances of the local dwellers. This underlines the solid institutionalisation of peacebuilding process at the local level so as to facilitate communal tolerance and accommodation among residents. Remarkably, the singular criticism of the Lederach's structural framework for peacebuilding is the more emphasis placed on the top-bottom capacity of the peace enhancement process. Instead, looking at the abridging position of the second actors, intervention of the middle actors seem preferable to the trickling-down process of the top-level actors, because the middle peace actors could easily interfere in peacebuilding and make reports to appropriate higher authorities for consolidation of the decisive peace actions (Olayiwola and Okorie, 2010) . Rather, at best, practical reconciliatory ideas and initiative can be locally generated at the grassroots level and bubbled them up to produce unanimouslyaccepted peace process that embraces the views of all stakeholders. A typical example is the case of Ethiopia, El Salvador and especially Somalia, where local peace conferences with representatives of the different clans achieved a series of agreements that generated a similar process at the higher levels. Concrete peacebuilding would seem practicable, since those involved in the conflict are also involved the conflict resolution processes.
STUDY AREA
This study was carried out in Southwestern Nigeria. The justification for choosing this region is because it is relatively homogenous. This geopolitical zone comprises of six states, namely: LGA, representing Ondo South Senatorial district.
METHODOLOGY
Primary data were utilised for this study. These data were sourced through the administration of questionnaire and conduct of in-depth interview. Quantitative data were generated from responses to the questionnaire. The study population 1, 215 comprised Local Council Officers (94), they are involved in this study because they are the authorities in charge of the coordination of maintenance of law, peace, and order at the local level; Traditional Chiefs (135), because they play significant roles in social harmony, peace and development at the local level; executive members of Community Development Associations (259), executive members of Market Women Associations (45) and key executive members of National Union of Road Transport Workers (45), because they constitute community members, thereby representing the local dwellers, volatile youths and groups mostly involved in ensuing conflict as well as peace building process at the local level; executive officials of Christian Association of Nigeria (99) and Muslims' Community (162), they are involved in this study because these religious associations admonish peaceful co-existence among members in the community. Also, it comprised executive members of Traditional Associations (53), because they are the indigenous regulatory associations in charge of social justice and traditional conflict resolution mechanisms; High chiefs of Hausa community (63) and Igbo community (45), they represent the Non-Indigenous Groups whose settlements in Southwestern Nigeria sometimes result to ethnoconflicts with indigenes, thus necessitating their inclusion in peace building process at local level; Customary Court Chiefs (108) and executive members of Community-Police Relations Committee (107), they represent the standing committees on conflictual issues ravaging communities. A sample fraction of 20%, making 243 respondents, was selected for questionnaire administration; and they were proportionately distributed across the 9 LGAs selected using multi-stage sampling technique. In addition, the qualitative data were gathered from the interview response. Interviews were conducted in the three selected States for each of their Attorneys-General, or their representatives, most especially on the conflict emanating from the political parties; Chairmen of the Nigerian Bar Associations, or their representatives; a Paramount Traditional Ruler in the three States; President, State Muslims' Community of the selected States; Chairman, Christianity Association of Nigeria State Chapter of the three States; and State Leaders of the two (2) Non-Indigenous Groups in the selected States, totaling (21) so as to complement information collected through questionnaire administration. Data collected via questionnaire were analysed using Relative Impact Index; and, content analysis method was used for the interview response.
CHALLENGES OF PEACEBUILDING IN SOUTHWESTERN NIGERIA
This section analysed challenges confronting the local institutions of governance on peace building in the study area. Using Likert-scale ratings, respondents were asked to agree or disagree with 10 assertions made by the researcher on the challenges confronting the institution. The Table  1 revealed the frequency and percentage distribution of respondents on each of the statement and its values/responses were organised, ranging from 1 to 5. In addition, the Sum Score and Relative Impact Index (RII) were adopted to examine and rate these challenges. Most remarkably, the majority of the statements were relatively acknowledged by the respondents as possible challenges since eight (8) out of the ten (10) of the weighted average scores were above 3.0 mid-point. However, the rating was further shown so as to analyse the most and least challenging ones. As presented in Table 1 , inadequate shared vision among the institutions of governance at the local level (item 1) was highly rated as the leading challenge confronting local institutions of governance on peace building in the study area with sum score (799) and RII (3.49). This was followed by the financial practices in peace building exercise which have, in most cases, failed to align with the peace building planning processes and priorities (Item 4), as confirmed by the sum score (764) and RII (3.34) . This is an indictment on the hosts of most community coalition programmes. It was also noted that poor communication, among the stakeholders, is an instrumental challenge to the implementation of peace building which had the same sum score (747) and RII (3.26), thus placing the item 8 as the third-rated challenge confronting the local institutions of governance on peace building in the study area. Also, the deficiency of institutional arrangement constitutes one of the impeding factors to the implementation of peace building strategies (item 5) was rated to be the fourth challenge confronting local institutions of governance on peace building in Southwestern Nigeria with sum score (743) and RII (3.24) . Managing the tradeoffs between conflicting issues with short and long-term objectives of peace building (item 2) was placed on the fifth position with the sum score (739) and RII (3.23) among the challenges facing local institutions of governance on peace building in the study area. Meanwhile, the third item, which states that peace building strategic plans most often failed in its implementation, was also ranked at the sixth position of the challenges facing local institutions of governance on peace building in local communities within Southwestern Nigeria with sum score (737) and RII (3.22 ). In addition, overreliance on international agencies for peace building initiatives is an inhibiting factor (item 10) was also statistically rated to be the seventh challenge confronting local institutions of governance on peace building in local communities within the study area with sum score (733) and RII (3.20) . The eighth position was occupied by the item 6, examples of consistent citizen involvement in peace building process are somehow rare, with the sum score (695) and RII (3.03) . At the bottom line, the implementation of peace building strategies has been more of a centralised matter was rated to be the second to the last among the listed challenges posing threats to the local institutions of governance on peace building in Southwestern Nigeria with sum score (667) and RII (2.91). However, this rating could be interpreted to denote that this factor is not one of the obtainable challenges facing local institutions of governance on peace building in Southwestern Nigeria, since the RII is below the mid-point of 3.0. Similarly, more respondents tended towards disagreement with the view that the task of peace building strategies is mostly and externally designed by international agencies without local inputs in most developing countries of the World. This, therefore, follows that the 10 th ranked factor is not a relative challenge, thus it does not constitute one of the impeding factors affecting local institutions of governance on peace building in Southwestern Nigeria. In the discourse with respected lawyers, value system was clearly identified as a broad challenge for all other forms of challenges confronting local institutions of governance on peace building. This value system is not only being suffered by the people, but the traditional institutions also parade some attributes of social vices which berate the integrity of local institutions of governance in Southwestern Nigeria.
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
Furthermore, the findings of this study revealed that lack of shared vision (RII = 3.49) was rated leading challenge confronting local governance on peace building strategies. Reports of AU in 2007 and OECD in 2010 acknowledged that evidences appear to be abounding on the lack of shared vision for change among the institutions of governance at the local level. The quantitative data analysis also found out that financial practice in the peace building exercise (RII = 3.34) was a notable challenge facing local governance on peace building in Southwestern Nigeria. The qualitative data analysis however confirmed the same position that the logistics and traditional administrative procedures are mostly hampered by running costs. In line with both quantitative and qualitative data analyses, the study of Ugwu in 2008 and OECD report in 2010 had earlier noted that financial aids are, most times, distributed in a disaggregated ways, thus distorting the logistics and peace enhancement framework. Several studies have identified poor strategic communication as an instrumental challenge facing local institutions of governance during the implementation of peace building strategies (AU, 2007; OECD, 2010; UNDP, 2010; and Noll, 2013) . This empirical discourse was affirmed by both quantitative and qualitative analyses. The quantitative results showed that poor communication (RII = 3.26) was rated as the third challenge confronting local governance on peace building in Southwestern Nigeria. Also, the interview response stressed poor information network as a factor that incapacitates peacemaking and peace-keeping in local communities within Southwestern Nigeria. In most developing countries, the deficiency of institutional arrangement constitutes one of the impeding factors to the implementation of peace building strategies (Oguonu and Ezeibe, 2014). This is not deviant from what is obtainable in Southwestern Nigeria. The quantitative data gathered from the region rated deficiency of institutional arrangement (RII = 3.24) as the fourth challenge facing local governance on peace building. The interview response further exposed that the traditional institutions also parade some attributes of social vices which berate the integrity of local institutions of governance in Southwestern Nigeria. Furthermore, Mofasony (2012) and Howard (2012) assumed that the possibility of trade-offs among local institutions is most likely obtainable in developing countries of the World. This assumption was verified by the quantitative data analysis which placed managing trade-offs between conflicting issues on the fifth position with the sum score (739) and RII (3.23) among the challenges facing local institutions of governance on peace building in the study area. One of the common challenges identified by extant studies is that few countries with national peace building strategic plans most often failed in its implementation (Aning, 2008; Obiekwu, 2009; UNDP, 2010; MacGinty, 2013; and Okoro, 2014) . Similarly, the empirical position has a pragmatic reflection in Nigeria. The quantitative data analysis ranked failure of implementation strategies of peace building at the sixth position among the challenges facing local institutions of governance on peace building in local communities within Southwestern Nigeria with sum score (737) and RII (3.22) . Also, most African states have failed to internalise the peace building capacities due to their over-reliance on International agencies for humanitarian assistance (OECD, 2010; and UNDP, 2010) . This view synchronises with the quantitative results of this study in which over-reliance on International agencies (RII = 3.20) was also statistically rated to be the seventh challenge confronting local institutions of governance on peace building architecture in Africa. The least challenge of local governance on peace building is inconsistent citizen involvement in peace building processes (RII = 3.03). The qualitative response observed that the inconsistent citizen involvement is hoisted on the debauched attitude of youth which constitutes the main challenge to peace building in Southwestern Nigeria. Above all, a common challenging predisposition of local governance on peace building is the erratic non-compliance with the traditional customs and beliefs due to educational exposure, westernisation and religious teachings. In consonance with interview response, it was also noted that non-compliance
